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Abstract:  Bycatch is a nearly universal problem for fisheries, and it is becoming 
increasingly common to place strict limits on allowable bycatch, either on 
individuals or as a cap on an industry sectors bycatch. Individual bycatch 
quotas strengthen individual incentives to avoid bycatch and may reduce 
the likelihood that the bycatch cap will limit target species catch. However, 
in cases where bycatch is highly uncertain and highly variable, individual 
quotas and markets may not function effectively and efficiently. In some 
cases, such as sea turtles, marine mammals and rare seabird bycatch, the 
allowable take may be less than one take per permit holder making it 
difficult to allocate quota to individuals. There are a number of reasons, 
theoretical and empirical, to believe that a transferable quota market may 
not function effectively in cases like this, including very thin markets and 
very limited information with which to assess quota value for trading. I 
focus here on the implications of stochasticity and uncertainty of incidental 
catch for valuing quota in an individual quota system that includes both 
target species and incidentally caught species. I evaluate the degree to 
which quota markets reduces individual risk relative to simply having a 
non-transferable individual bycatch quota and also explore how pooling 
approaches and possibly market insurance can be used to increase value 
and reduce risk for fishermen.  
 